Conceptually, the position of Bulgaria and Romania as 'outliers' in the process of the EU's eastwards enlargement offers a critical test case to the thesis of enlargement-led Europeanisation. It also points to the significance of domestic mediating factors that condition the transformational impact of the EU and have produced divergent reform trajectories across Central and Eastern Europe.
In policy terms, too, the imperative of dealing with 'outliers' (and more generally with the significant degree of diversity amongst accession candidates) underlines the highly contingent and evolutionary nature of the EU's enlargement strategy. The word 'strategy' is used here with a degree of caution for, ever since its inception in the early 1990s, the EU's approach vis-à-vis its accession hopefuls has been built upon an uncomfortable dualism: on the one hand the building of a rule-governed process structured around the principle of conditionality and, on the other, the preservation of a significant element of discretion about the interpretation and implementation of these rules.
The position of the Commission in this process -both as a 'policy entrepreneur' (Kingdon, 1984) on enlargement and as the arbitrator of the 'rules of the game' -has been crucially important. From an early stage the Commission assumed a key role in driving the enlargement agenda forward against the backdrop of internal EU divisions (over the pace and scope of the process) as well a rapidly changing geopolitical context involving, amongst others, the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia and NATO enlargement. Under these circumstances the Commission was called to exercise discretion that went well beyond the bureaucratic oversight of the accession negotiations and deployed a different mix of rewards and punishments for each candidate country. Naturally the premises and implications of such discretion acquired far greater significance for 'marginal candidates' on the edges of the enlargement process. This process has often been referred to as 'Europeanisation'. Initially the term was used to describe the way in which the experience of EU membership affected 'the organisational logic of national politics and policy making' in the member states (Ladrech, 1994, 69) . Radaelli speaks of Europeanisation as a process of 'construction, diffusion and institutionalisation' of EU rules that shape 'domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies' (Radaelli, 2003, 30) . Owing to its rapid expansion over the past decade, the literature on Europeanisation offers us today a bewildering array of perspectives, ranging from case-specific manifestations of Europeanisation dynamics (e.g. Börzel, 1999) to more general conceptualisations on the nature of the interactivity between European and national levels (e.g. Cowles et al 2001; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005) and the mechanisms through which Europeanisation impacts on domestic politics (e.g. Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999) .
More recently conceptualisations of Europeanisation as an 'export' -particularly in the context of the EU's eastwards enlargement -have also been utilised to illustrate the impact of the EU beyond its own geographical confines (e.g. Lippert et al 2001; Goetz 2001b; Grabbe 2003; Phinnemore 2004, 2008) . The principle of conditionality -one of the key components of the EU's strategy in post-communist Central and Eastern
Europe -is widely acknowledged to be the driving force behind the process of enlargement-led Europeanisation. Indeed the principle of conditionality, with all its multiple guises and methods of application, has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, both in the context of EU enlargement and the wider field of the EU's external relations (see, for example, Pridham, 2002; Smith, 1998 Smith, , 2005 . Building on a rationalist perspective, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier define conditionality as a 'bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, 662) .
Under this external incentives model, actors are assumed to be utilitymaximisers, whose preferences are determined by 'cost and benefit' calculations, shaped by four main factors: the clarity of EU conditions; the size and speed of rewards; the credibility of threats and promises; and the size of adoption costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004) .
The ambiguities surrounding the definition and application of externally imposed norms on post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe are discussed by Hughes et al who argue that EU conditionality is not 'a uniformly hard rule-based instrument, but rather a highly differentiated one' (Hughes et al, 2004: 256 
Iconic acts of differentiation
The first and more obvious observation relates to the delay (compared with Central and Eastern Europe's frontrunners) with which Bulgaria and Romania have ascended the ladder of contractual relations with the EU (see Table 1 ). 1998 13.12.2002 16.04.2003 01.05.2004 Source: Own representation.
Although the overthrown of Todor Zhivkov and Nicolae Ceauşescu on 10
November and 24 December 1989 respectively followed very soon after the collapse of the Berlin Wall (9 November), the nature of regime change in both Bulgaria and Romania produced a far weaker reform impetus by comparison to those witnessed in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The outcome of the first multi-party elections in Romania (May 1990) and Bulgaria (June 1990) confirmed Western suspicions that much of the previous communist order had remained intact in both countries. In this sense Bulgaria and Romania failed to meet the first (implicit) conditionality for advancing their relations with the EU: a clean break from their communist past and the emergence of reformminded governments.
The implications of this setback first became evident during the second half of 1990, 2 when the EU revealed its association strategy for the CEE countries.
Hence, whereas Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were invited to negotiate their Europe Agreements with the EU in September 1990, neither Bulgaria nor Romania was asked to do so. The two Balkan countries were 'officially'
decoupled from Central and Eastern Europe's frontrunners As a result, the Romanian and Bulgarian Europe Agreements were signed in February and March 1993 respectively, over a year later than those between the EU and the then 'Visegrád Three'.
From that point onwards the reputation of Bulgaria and Romania as 'outliers' in the process of the EU's eastwards enlargement never seriously recovered.
The publication by the Commission in July 1997 of Agenda 2000 and its opinion on the membership applications of the ten CEE countries confirmed that the pace of reform in both countries had fallen behind those of the region's frontrunners. 3 Indicative of this was the fact that both Bulgaria and Romania were judged to have failed the economic criteria set in Copenhagen, whereas Romania and Slovakia were the only candidate countries to have failed to meet fully the political criteria (Phinnemore and Papadimitriou, 2008 Sedelmeier, 2005) . This 'learning by doing' approach to enlargement allowed the EU to revisit and adjust some of the key components of its strategy in the region in light of its experiences of dealing with the frontrunners of the process, but also in anticipation of the challenges likely to emerge in subsequent waves of applicants (see below).
Much to their frustration, Bulgaria and Romania were first exposed to tighter EU conditionalities during the negotiation of their Association agreements in 1992. Upon the insistence of the EU, the Bulgarian and Romanian Europe Agreements included in their preamble a specific 'human rights clause' that made explicit reference to the protection of minority rights (see Table 2 ). In addition, Article 118 (paragraph 2) of the Final Provisions of the agreements included a 'unilateral suspension clause' that allowed either party to suspend co-operation in case of failure (of the opposite party) to fulfil the obligations prescribed in the agreement (Papadimitriou, 2002) . As neither clause was included in the first set of Europe Agreements with the 'Visegrád Three', the tightening of political conditionalities for the two Balkan applicants was interpreted as a reflection of widespread scepticism in Brussels over the pace of their democratic transitions and the treatment of the substantial Turkish and
Hungarian minorities in Bulgaria and Romania respectively (the latter being a major case for concern). 4 For Romania the scope of enhanced conditionality went even further by allowing the Council to activate the postponement clause by qualified majority voting if Romania's progress towards implementing eleven specific areas of the acquis was not satisfactory (see Table 2 ). The 11 policy areas stipulated in Annex IX of the Accession Treaty were: 1) the implementation of the Schengen Action Plan; 2) control and surveillance at the future external borders of the Union; 3) the implementation of the Action Plan and Strategy for the Reform of the Judiciary; 4) the enforcement of anti-corruption legislation and the effective independence of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutors' Office (NAPO); 5) the full implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy; 6) improvements in the operations of the gendarmerie and the police; 7) the implementation of the strategy to protect victims of trafficking; 8) further investigations into accusations of state aid to the energy sector; 9) the strengthening of the State aid enforcement record; 10) the submission of a revised steel restructuring plan and 11) the strengthening of the financial means and human resources of Despite its more positive overtone, however, the Commission's report fell short 7 For Bulgaria these can be summarised as follows: protection of intellectual and industrial property rights in the company law field and motor vehicle insurance in the services chapter; the paying agency and the integrated administration and control system; the common market organisation on milk; transmissible spongiforme encephalopathies (TSEs) and animal by-products; the veterinary control system and animal diseases control; trade in live animals and animal products; veterinary public health and animal welfare in the chapter on agriculture; institutional structures and financial management and control in the area of regional policy; application of the Schengen acquis; management of the future EU external border; police cooperation; and fight against organised crime and fraud and corruption. See European Commission (2005a). For Romania these can be summarised as follows: public procurement in free movement of goods; protection of intellectual and industrial property rights in company law; setting up of paying agencies and implementation of an integrated administration and control system; measures relating to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) and animal by-products; veterinary control system in the internal market; animal disease control measures; veterinary public health; administrative capacity in the taxation area; strengthening of institutional structures and financial management and control mechanisms to deal with regional policy; coordination of structural instruments; industrial pollution and overall administrative capacity in the field of environment; application of the Schengen acquis; management of the future EU external border; fight against fraud and corruption. See European Commission (2005b). Report on the impact of these new laws and of the penal and administrative procedure codes, notably on the pre-trial phase; c) continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, accountability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the results annually; d) conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public institutions and on the publication of assets of high-level officials; e) take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the borders and within local government; f) implement a strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on serious crime, money laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation of assets of criminals. Report on new and ongoing investigations, indictments and convictions in these areas. See European Commission (2006d). The benchmarks for Romania were: a) ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process notably by enhancing the capacity and accountability of the Superior Council of Magistracy. Report and monitor the impact of the new civil and penal procedures codes; b) establish, as foreseen, an integrity agency with responsibilities for verifying assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest, and for issuing mandatory decisions on the basis of which dissuasive sanctions can be taken; c) continue to conduct professional, non-partisan investigations into allegations of high-level corruption; d) take further measures to prevent and fight against corruption, in particular within the local government. See European Commission (2006e).
future rounds of EU enlargement will be discussed in more detail in the concluding section of this article.
The 'Securitisation' of EU Marginalisation
An (Papadimitriou, 2002) . In later years, references to the fragility of their own imperfect democracies and their potential implosion into Balkan instability have also helped the two countries to resist the danger of more a permanent form of isolation from the European mainstream (Phinnemore, 2000) . For
Romania, in particular, its especially traumatic communist experience (the 'Ceauşescu factor') and its population size ('too big to be ignored') and have 
